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Is Incoherence Outrageous?
Cass R. Sunstein,* Daniel Kahneman,**

David Schkade*** & Ilana Ritov****
For their valuable comments, we are most grateful to Cary Coglianese,'
Mark Kelman, 2 and the team of Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and
Martin Wells (hereafter ER&W).3 ER&W offer a great deal of information
about the real world of punitive damages, presenting a mixed verdict on our
basic claims. Coglianese provides an impressively detailed account of the
problem of achieving coherence in the world of administrative penalties.
Kelman questions the importance of coherence and also urges that in many
cases, people's judgments may be better if they lack a global perspective. We
are pleased to say that we have few significant disagreements with the three
commentaries. In brief, we think that ER&W's evidence is fully consistent
with our basic claims, despite a conservative test; that Coglianese has
elaborated helpfully on the problem of achieving coherence in civil penalties;
and that Kelman's basic arguments should not be taken to dispute our claims,
which are less different from his own than a reader of his commentary might
infer. Apart from these points, which we elaborate below, we offer a more
general suggestion, one that is perhaps insufficiently emphasized in our main
paper: Even if it is demonstrated, incoherence usually is not taken to be
outrageous. The persistence of incoherence, in many domains of the law, is
closely connected with this psychological fact.

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago.
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs, Princeton
University
Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business, University of Texas, Austin.
Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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I. EXPERIMENTS AND THE REAL WORLD

ER&W provide an instructive look at the real-world of punitive damage
awards. The most novel part of their essay offers some intriguing data analysis,
suggesting that the incoherence that we describe actually exists, and hence that
there is a "degree of support"4 for our claims in real-world data. But thinking
that few "complaints about a legal system resonate louder than charges of
incoherence," 5 ER&W object that if our argument is right, we should "be
observing a legal system on the verge of collapse," 6 because any "society
would find a torrent of incoherent legal judgments to be unfair, unjust,
unpredictable, and unmanageable." 7 And in a discussion of prior findings that
appears to be in some tension with their new analysis, ER&W contend that the
system of punitive damages is actually quite coherent, showing a high degree
of predictability. Of the three comments, ER&W's raises the most complex
issues, and we shall discuss those issues in some detail.
A. A New Analysis

ER&W's innovative empirical analysis is based on their (welcome) claim
that our essay can be used to generate testable hypotheses. They offer three
such hypotheses. The first involves juries. In their view, we would predict that
juries, which make decisions in isolation, would produce, across diverse
categories of cases, the same statistical relationship between punitive awards
and compensatory awards. The second hypothesis involves judges, who
observe cases from many categories. ER&W think that we would predict that
judges will be engaging in cross-category comparisons and hence that the
effects of case categories "should be greater in judge-tried cases than in jurytried cases."' Perhaps most interestingly, ER&W urge that if we are right,
judges will offer higher awards than juries in cases involving the more
prominent category of harm. The reason is that in cross-category comparisons,
the awards in the more prominent category typically increase; and judges, in
ER&W's view, are engaged in cross-category comparisons. ER&W rightly say
that the third hypothesis seems counterintuitive, even a bit odd. Could it be
right to suggest that when the harm is prominent, judges will produce higher
damage awards than juries?
Comparing actual awards in cases involving bodily injury to actual awards
in cases not involving bodily injury, ER&W find support for all three
hypotheses. For juries, the ratio of compensatory to punitive awards is about

4. Id. at 1243.
5. Id. at 1239.

6. Id. at 1240.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 1249.
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the same between cases involving bodily injury and cases not involving bodily
injury. For judges, punitive awards have a far higher ratio to compensatory
awards in cases involving bodily injury. Most strikingly, the counterintuitive
prediction is vindicated. The punitive award is likely to be much higher,
compared to the compensatory award, when judges are making the decision
than when juries are doing so.
ER&W have done a very creative job of adapting our account of punitive
damage assessment to produce testable hypotheses for their extensive data set.
We are of course delighted that our model passed the tests that they set for it.
Still, we should point out that these tests are overly severe and that our model
might have failed them even if it is basically correct. Three points deserve
mention. First, ER&W's analyses use compensatory damages as a proxy for
the "outrage x harm" 9 component of our model. But in our model, as in the
law, compensatory damages are linked only to the harm, not the outrageousness
of the defendant's behavior. The outrageousness (often called egregiousness)
of the defendant's behavior is not represented in the ER&W analyses, though it
is central to our model of how punitive damages are set. Second, ER&W's
analysis takes for granted that judges consider each case in a broader context,
one that includes cases from other categories. What is certainly true, and what
we emphasized, is that judges could consider cases through a wider viewscreen
because, unlike juries, they have encountered a varied set of cases. However,
we are not aware of any direct evidence that judges do spontaneously consider
particular cases in a broad context. Indeed, our original paper drew on work by
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich in raising doubts about precisely that point. 1°
The Supreme Court apparently has similar doubts about the width of the
screen judges use. In Leatherman the Court found it necessary to require even
appellate judges to engage in an explicit comparison (i.e., to use a wide screen)
in evaluating the constitutionality of damage awards, rather than trusting their
experience." Finally, ER&W's analyses use the contrast between cases with
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1166(2002).
10. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 778 (2001).
11. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424,440 (2001).
Differences in the institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges are consistent

with our conclusion. In [BMW of North Am. v.]
Gore [517 U.S. 559 (1996)], we instructed
courts evaluating a punitive damages award's consistency with due process to consider three
criteria: (1) the degree or reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the disparity
between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awardedby thejury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Only with respect to the first Gore
inquiry do the district courts have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals, and
even then the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility
and demeanor. Trial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing the
second factor. And the third Gore criterion, which calls for a broad legal comparison, seems
more suited to the expertise of appellate courts. Considerations of institutional competence
therefore fail
to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate review.
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1295 2001-2002
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and without physical injury as a proxy for the prominence of the case category.
While certainly a reasonable operationalization, this classification is imperfect
since the "non-physical" class includes many highly prominent categories (as
possible examples, consider sexual harassment and racial discrimination' 2),
again limiting our hypotheses' chances to succeed. In sum, because our
account of punitive damage assessment succeeded on this somewhat
unfavorable terrain, what ER&W call "modest" support should probably be
interpreted as much stronger.'3
One further point. ER&W contend that we predict that case categories will
play no role in jury cases; but the claim strikes us as too strong, and it is their
speculation, not ours. Indeed, compensatory awards typically differ among
categories, and hence categories will matter insofar as compensatory awards
operate as anchors. In our study compensatory damages were held constant.
But in an earlier study, mentioned briefly in our article, compensatories were
not constant in the isolation condition, and we found a large difference between
4
categories in the isolation condition.'
B. Predictabilityand Coherence

Notwithstanding the evidence just discussed, ER&W urge that "research on
quantitative judgments demonstrates substantial consistency in judgments."' 5
Drawing largely on an impressive and influential study by Eisenberg, Wells,
and three co-authors,16 ER&W claim that the legal system has proved its
"ability to reduce and manage the limitations of human judgment.' 7 In our
view, the real-world data do not support this optimistic conclusion, at least if
the optimism is applied to jury determinations.' 8 We have noted that in
Leatherman, the Supreme Court found the risks of arbitrary jury outcomes
sufficiently troubling to require de novo review of the constitutionality of jury
awards by appellate courts. Further, over half of punitive damage awards are

Id. (emphasis added, citations and footnote omitted).
12. We describe these as possible examples because we lack evidence on what
categories of"nonphysical" injury count as prominent.
13. See Deborah Prentice & Dale Miller, When Small Effects Are Impressive, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 112, 160-164 (1992) (giving an instance in which small effects are

impressive).
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, & Ilana Ritov, Legal
Coherence andIncoherence (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
15. Eisenberg, et al., supra note 3, at 1241.
16. See Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T.
Wells, The PredictabilityofPunitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 633-37 (1997).
17. Eisenberg, et al., supra note 3, at 1242.

18. See W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J.
381, 384-87 (1998).
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reduced or overturned.' 9 The process of appellate review can impose on all
parties involved substantial transaction costs and lead to situations in which
justice delayed becomes justice denied.
Before explaining the problem, we emphasize our agreement with many of
ER&W's conclusions. Punitive awards are indeed relatively rare. They are
especially uncommon in cases lacking intentional misconduct. Significantly,
the compensatory award plays a substantial role in determining the punitive
award. For this reason punitive awards are far from entirely unpredictable. But
ER&W downplay the existence of a great deal of noise in the system. The
studies that purport to show predictability find that the compensatory award
explains 46-47% of the variation in punitive damage awards, an impressive
figure to be sure, but one that leaves the majority of the variation unexplained.
The claim of predictability is further weakened by the fact that in the relevant
work, the focus of analysis is not on actual punitive damage awards, but on the
logarithm of such awards, which is the dependent variable that is being
explained. Any transformation of real awards into log awards will naturally
shrink much of the variation in the size of punitive damages awards. But
defendants pay their penalties in dollars, not in log dollars, and the uncertainty
they face when a punitive award could range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 is
rather more impressive than is conveyed when the same range is expressed in
log units (7 vs 9). With respect to predictability, judicial oversight and
appellate review can and do help, but we respectfully disagree with ER&W's
suggestion that the legal system has overcome the cognitive problems that we
have described. Consider the fact that another empirical study, based on a
larger sample than that used by ER&W, finds that punitive awards "are highly
variable and unpredictable." 20
But coherence, not predictability, is our focus here. To the extent that
ER&W are able to establish predictability, they have not established coherence.
To see this point, begin with the fact that because of the difficulty of translating
moral judgments into dollars, anchors will loom very large. The compensatory
award is the most readily available anchor, and in light of the translation
problem, it should be no surprise that that award helps to explain the punitive
award. And when people are making judgments in isolation, the anchor will
have an especially big effect, indeed a bigger effect than it has when people
look at two or more cases at once. Here, then, is the problem. Because

19. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1093, 1115-16 (1996) (citing studies finding that jury punitive damage awards are
reduced in fifty percent or more of product liability cases).
20. See Jonathan Karpoff & John Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of
Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 527, 571 (1999). The authors do find that
compensatory awards, alongside other identifiable factors (such as lawsuit type, firm
characteristics, and location of suit), can explain as much as 50% of the variation in punitive
awards. But without prior information that there will be a punitive award, "only 1-2 percent
of the variation in punitive awards can be explained." Id.

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1297 2001-2002
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compensatory awards in certain categories of cases (for example, commercial
fraud cases) are typically larger than compensatory awards in other categories
of cases (for example, personal injury cases), punitive awards will be larger in
the former set of cases as well, regardless of the relative outrageousness of
cases from the two categories. The existing research shows that this difference
is entirely predictable. But that very difference is a form of predictable
incoherence in the sense that we discuss. The reason is that people are most
unlikely to approve of the pattern of outcomes that emerges from their own
judgments in isolation. And one reason for the disapproval is that anchors have
a larger effect on judgments in isolation than on comparative judgments. We
can now see that if, as ER&W urge, compensatory awards are acting as the
anchor, people's judgments will appear to make sense on their own, but will
not make sense, by people's own lights, when taken together.
In this light, it is possible to dissolve the tension between the apparently
conflicting empirical claims reported by ER&W. First, punitive awards do
indeed have some degree of predictability (although that predictability is more
impressive for scholars who think in terms of logarithms than for plaintiffs and
defendants, who think about actual dollars). Second, punitive awards can be
shown to be incoherent, in the sense that people's decisions in isolation do not
match their decisions if they are engaging in cross-category comparisons. The
two claims are not in conflict.
C. PublicIndifference
Now let us turn to ER&W's broadest claim. They contend that if
incoherence is pervasive, the legal system would be "on the verge of
collapse," 2' and people would be up in arms. The "paradox" lies in the fact that
"the system seems to work well, despite the well-founded concerns"2 of our
article.
We do not think that there is any paradox. Because people do not naturally
seek coherence, it seems to us wrong to suggest that incoherence, in the domain
of punitive damages, would produce any kind of public outcry. Suppose, for
example, that a presidential candidate of either party, armed with sensational
data, wanted to make an energetic and dramatic campaign speech, in which he
demonstrated, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that punitive awards in some
categories of cases were far too low when taken in comparison with awards in
other categories of cases. If you were the candidate's campaign manager,
would you urge him to deliver-that speech? Would the speech be taken to have
uncovered an outrage? Would the candidate make a public splash? We doubt it.
For the same reason that people do not spontaneously worry over coherence,
incoherence, when brought to public attention, is a reason for embarrassment
21. Eisenberg, et al., supra note 3, at 1240.
22. Id. at 1241.
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and possibly reform-but hardly an outrage. Because of the relative
indifference to incoherence, the system may appear "to work well"2 even
when it in fact does not.
II. ACHIEVING COHERENCE

Like ER&W, Coglianese is concerned to connect our arguments to realworld evidence about law and policy.24 But while ER&W concentrate on
punitive damage awards, Coglianese examines administrative penalties. His
overall goal is to show that incoherence cannot be established simply by
finding disparities in congressionally-specified penalty amounts. It is necessary
to ask many more questions.
Coglianese says, rightly, that our discussion of administrative penalties is
focused on what he calls the problem of "comparative coherence."2 He insists
that seemingly inexplicable variations in dollar amounts are only partly
informative. Suppose, for example, that those who injure birds are subject to a
federal penalty of $20,000, but that those who subject employees to dangerous
working conditions are subject to a federal penalty of $10,000. Is this proof of
incoherence? Not necessarily. For example, employers may be subject to stiff,
additional penalties under state law while those who injure birds may not be;
the lower federal penalties may make a great deal of sense once federal and
state penalties are taken together. It is also possible that the government
regularly enforces the latter statute, and infrequently enforces the former-and
hence the disparity in penalties is sensibly responsive to varying enforcement
levels.
Coglianese offers an impressive account of the many variables that must be
examined in order to reach firm conclusions about coherence. He is correct to
insist that judgments of incoherence might themselves reflect a form of
bounded rationality-a failure to take account of considerations (such as
additional penalties and the level of enforcement activity) that actually matter a
great deal. But we are sure that Coglianese would agree that people, including
policymakers, rarely attempt to make anything like the necessary assessment.
It would be heroic, and in our view implausible, to think that the existing array
of administrative penalties reflects considered judgments about the factors that
Coglianese rightly identifies. So too with existing variations in cost-per-lifesaved. As Coglianese urges, no sensible person could urge that every program
for risk reduction should have the same cost-per-life-saved. Contextual factors,
including distributional issues, matter a great deal. But incorporating
contextual factors is most unlikely to rescue the current system from the charge
of incoherence.
23. Id.

24. Coglianese, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 1219.
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Coglianese raises the possibility that after all relevant sanctions have been
imposed, there will be less incoherence than it would seem if we focus on only
one type of penalty. But we think that Coglianese would agree that
incoherence is likely to be substantial, all the more in light of the fact that the
greater the number of different proceedings that must be initiated to achieve a
coherent penalty, the less likely it is that a sensible overall outcome will be
achieved. The execution of a complex strategy is harder than a simpler one,
and a complex task will inevitably have higher transaction costs. Indeed, we
greatly doubt that administrative penalties are in fact set through deliberate
consideration of all the variables to which Coglianese draws attention. The
relative coherence of penalties within categories itself suggests that these
variables do not play a major role, simply because there is no reason to assume
that the variables in question are kept constant within categories. For example,
if we compare a violation of the African Elephant Conservation Act 26 and a

violation of the law protecting Bald and Golden Eagles (carrying the same
penalty),27 it is not obvious why the existence of other liability, or the
availability of other remedies to ensure compliance, or the probability of
detection, and so forth, would be the same in both cases.
One of the most striking features of Coglianese's discussion is the support
that it gives to our claim that full coherence is exceedingly difficult or perhaps
impossible to achieve in practice (assuming we could agree on what it means in
principle). Nonetheless, we think that much can be done to reduce the most
serious anomalies. This point brings us directly to Kelman's paper.
III. PREScRIPTIwE, NOT NORMATIVE

Our major concern with Kelman's interesting discussionn2 is that he has
taken issue with claims that we do not make. Contrary to Kelman's suggestion,
we do not believe that category-bound judgments are always inferior to the
judgments made in cross-category comparisons. And in analyzing punitive
damage reform, our approach is prescriptive rather than normative. We seek to
show how certain social goals might be obtained, without saying anything
about the appropriate goals of punitive awards. We attempt to dispel four
misunderstandings here.
First, we do not say (and do not believe) that those who make categorybound judgments are "irrational." 29 Indeed we do not mean to make any
controversial claims about the nature of rationality. Our more cautious
suggestions are that category-bound thinking does give rise to incoherence, in
the sense that we describe it, and that incoherence is indeed a problem. We
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201.4246 (2002)
27. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)
28. Kelman, supra note 2.
29. Id. at 1275.
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plead innocent to Kelman's charge that we have offered an "unduly casual
invocation of the 'rationality' norm."3' We have no view about Kelman's claim
that law students are rational to be intensely disappointed when they do not
receive job offers from their preferred law firm; and nothing we say speaks to
his suggestion that intense emotional reactions are generally rational if they
promote people's subjective ends.
Second, we do not think, as Kelman suggests, that "the global perspective
is always optimal." 3' We meant to be very tentative here, suggesting only "that
most people, in most conditions, prefer a wide viewscreen to a narrow one, and
will in principle (though not always in actual practice) have greater confidence
in the judgments they make in a broad context rather than in a narrow
context." 32 We do not disagree with Kelman's suggestion that in some
circumstances, people's judgments may be better when and because they are
category-bound. (Certainly we do not mean to say anything about "the
33
appropriate response to misbehavior by one's child"! )
Third, Kelman misunderstands our argument in objecting that we
emphasize coherence-what he calls "horizontal equity"3 4 -at the expense of
other social goals, and in insisting that it might be sensible to sacrifice
coherence for the sake of ensuring that punishments are not too severe or too
lenient. We agree with Kelman's suggestion that horizontal "equity is at best
but one value."3s We said that "coherence is not a trumping value, and a
system displaying incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but
pervasively unjust."36 We urged only that at "the very least, efforts should be
made to correct the most conspicuous anomalies-a goal that can be obtained
without thinking that it is easy or even possible for people to agree on what full
' 7
coherence actually requires. 3
Fourth, Kelman is mistaken to say that according to our argument, "we
should assess punitive damages in accord with a sense of outrage because we
typically do."3 He urges (far more modestly than Hume) that "it is never clear
why we should derive an 'ought' from an 'is'; 39 he adds that perhaps punitive
damages should not be understood in terms of outrage at all. But we did not
intend to accept any particular normative theory of punitive damages. We
certainly did not mean to express any view on the retributive view of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1275.
Sunstein et al., supra note 14, at 1179.
Kelman, supranote 2, at 1276.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
Sunstein et al.,
supra note 14, at 1203.
Id. at 1203.

38. Kelman, supra note 2, at 1289.
39. Id.
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punishment. Our goals, here as in other work, are descriptive and prescriptive
rather than normative: Why are awards what they are? Assuming that the legal
system has as a certain goal, how does it best get there? If optimal deterrence
is the goal, it does not make much sense to rely on juries. If the goal is to
reduce incoherence while retaining a large role for retributive thinking, the
legal system might attempt to use additur and remittur to increase anomalously
low awards and to decrease anomalously high ones. But as we also say, a
society "should be willing to tolerate a degree of predictable incoherence if this
is the price of avoiding a (coherent) set of biased and unjust awards." 0
IV. OUTRAGE
Much of our work on punitive damages has been concerned with the topic
of outrage. In our view, outrage is associated with an urge to punish, which is
the foundation for such awards. 41 Jurors' reactions to misconduct are rooted in
judgments about whether the defendant has done something that qualifies as
genuinely outrageous. We have also shown that outrage itself is categorybound. What appears outrageous in isolation may appear barely objectionable
when placed in the context of far more egregious wrongdoing.
Our investigation has brought new clarity to a not unrelated point: Withincategory incoherence is easily noticed and arouses a strong sense of injustice.
Incoherence across categories is harder to see and less impressive when it is
seen. People do not spontaneously question the coherence of their judgments
across category boundaries, and are not greatly exercised by incoherence when
it is drawn explicitly to their attention. Nonetheless, incoherence can be a
serious problem, indeed a source of real injustice. We are not exactly outraged.
But we think that much more can, and should, be done to reduce the problem.

40. Sunstein et al., supranote 14, at 1183.
41. Indeed, the legal criteria for awarding punitive damages seem almost a recipe for
outrage, for example, "reckless disregard for the welfare of others" or "gross deviation from
the normal standard of care." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A.
SCHKADE &

W. Kip Viscusi, PUNITIVE

DAMAGES:

How JuRIEs

DECIDE

punitive damage instructions).
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